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Case No. 14565 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from a judgment in his favor 
and against respondents based on a breach of two real 
estate contracts. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A p p e l l a n t ' s c r o s s c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t s 
was* t r i e d w i t h o u t j u r y b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e James S . 
Sawaya on January 16, 19 76 at which time the lower 
court held in favor of appellant but limited recovery 
to appellant's out-of-pocket loss and denied appellant's 
request for attorney's fees and costs of court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an increase in the judgment 
by using as the measure of damages the benefit of the 
bargain rule or, in the alternative, the true amount 
paid by appellant to respondents. In addition appellant 
seeks a reversal of the lower court's order denying 
attorney's fees and court costs. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The property in question was acquired by tax 
deed dated June 6, 19 49 by Rermold Pender and respondent 
J. H. Ehlers. Mr. Pender died in 1963 and his estate, 
including the property in question, was distributed to 
his two daughters, respondents Evelyn P. Boyce and Lois 
P. Connell, pursuant to a Decree of Distribution dated 
November 29, 1966. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law supporting the Judgment entered for plaintiffs 
below.) 
Mr. Boyce, the husband of respondent Boyce, 
acted as the agent for respondents Boyce and Connell in 
administering the estate of Mr. Pender from the time of 
his death in 1963 to the closing of the estate in 1966. 
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(Tr. p. 37.) This included the duty to pay the taxes 
on all the property in the estate, including the property 
in question. (Tr. p. 39.) 
On August 20, 19 73 appellant purchased from all 
these respondents by virtue of two Uniform Real Estate 
Contracts the property in question. Within four months 
thereafter the plaintiffs in the lower court case began 
their action for adverse possession against the respon-
dents but did not join appellant as a party defendant 
until June 16, 1975. Until then appellant did not know 
that a lawsuit had been filed. (Tr. pp. 51-52.) When 
appellant was served, respondents refused to take his 
defense. CTr. p. 52.) Appellant was therefore separately 
represented in the lower case action. At the conclusion 
of that case a judgment for plaintiffs was granted. No 
appeal was taken from that judgment. 
Appellant in his answer also filed a cross com-
plaint action against respondents and the hearing on that 
claim was deferred by the court until after the judgment 
for the plaintiffs was entered. Shortly thereafter the 
cross complaint of appellant against respondents was heard 
by the court. At the time of the hearing of the cross 
complaint, appellant was prepared to pay the remaining 
amount due under the contracts, which amount could be 
available within a day or two. (Tr. pp. 52, 5 8.) 
Judgment was entered for appellant based on the 
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theory of out-of-pocket loss. Because of certain claimed 
difficulties with the judgment as prepared by respondents 
and entered by the court, appellant made a timely objec-
tion to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
judgmentfwhich objections the lower court denied. There-
after this appeal was taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE CROSS-
COMPLAINANT DAMAGES FOR CROSS-DEFENDANT'S BREACH OF THE 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS IN THE AMOUNT OF THE MARKET 
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AT THE DATE OF THE BREACH LESS THE 
AMOUNT REMAINING TO BE PAID ON THE CONTRACTS. 
The court below determined that for vendors-
respondents1 breach of contract the purchaser-appellant 
was entitled to damages under the out-of-pocket loss 
rule, or the amount paid on the contract. However, while 
it is true that there is a division of authority as to 
the appropriate measure of damages when it becomes impos-
sible for a vendor to convey real property to a purchaser, 
(see 48 ALR 19-24; 68 ALR 140-141), the clear position 
of Utah is that in such situations the benefit of the 
bargain rule applies to determine the measure of damages. 
Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Ut.2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962) (hereinafte 
Bunnell). With regard to this rule this Court held in 
Bunnell at 601: 
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The measure of damages where the vendor has 
breached a land sale contract is the market 
value of the property at the time of the 
breach less the contract price to the vendor. 
This formula for determining damages when the vendor fails to 
convey property to the purchaser is the so-called "American" 
rule. 10 Villanova Law Review 557 (1965). It is the 
rule in a good number of western jurisdictions, some of 
them relying on Bunnell as authority. Manson v. Manson, 
529 P.2d 1343 (Colo. App. 1974) (citing Bunnell as authority) 
Bennett v. Moring, 522 P.2d 741 (Colo. App. 1974); Aboud 
v. Adams, 84 N.M. 683, 507 P.2d 430 (1973) (citing Bunnell 
as authority); Conely v. Davidson, 35 N.M. 173, 291 P. 
489 (1930); Freedman v. Cholick, 233 Or. 569, 379 P.2d 
575 (1963); Crahane v. Swan, 212 Or. 143, 318 P.2d 942 
(1957). See also Williams v. Havens, 92 Ida. 439 444 
P.2d 132 (1968); Higgins v. Belson, 66 Ida. 736, 168 P.2d 
813 (1946). In addition, many courts in other regions 
have also adopted this rule. 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser, 
§ 592-593; Williston on Contracts § 1399 at 524 (3d ed. 
1968) . 
Some courts have suggested that recovery under 
the benefit of the bargain rule requires a showing of 
bad faith. On the other hand, many courts have explicitly 
or impliedly rejected any requirement of bad faith in 
order for a vendee to recover the benefit of the bargain. 
Indeed, none of the western jurisdictions cited above 
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require such a showing. The reasons for not applying 
a bad faith test are set out in Crahane v. Swan, supra 
at 948-9, and paraphrased in 77 Am, Jur. 2d Vendor and 
Purchaser, § 52 3: 
The rule is well established that where the 
vendor has title, and for any reason refuses 
to convey it, as required by the terms of the 
agreement, he shall respond in damages, and 
make good to the vendee whatever he may have 
lost by reason of the breach* So far as money 
can do it, the vendee must be placed in the 
same situation with regard to damages as if 
the contract had been specifically performed; 
and the measure of such damages will ordinarily 
be the difference between the contract price 
and the value of the property at the time of 
the breach. This has always been regarded 
as the true measure of damages in actions on 
contracts for the future delivery of marketable 
commodities, and it makes no difference in 
principle whether the contract be for the sale 
of real or personal property. In both instances 
the vendee is entitled to have the thing agreed 
for at the contract price, and to sell it him-
self at its increased value, and if it be 
withheld the vendor should make good to him 
the difference. 
Nevertheless, even if Utah were to require 
bad faith on the vendor's part in order to allow a purchaser 
to recover the loss of the benefit of the bargain, because 
of the facts in this case the appellant would still be 
entitled to the market value of the land less the contract 
price, (or if part of the contract price has been paid, 
as was the circumstance in the instant case, the market 
value of the property less the unpaid purchase money. 
92 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 596.) The rule of bad 
faith in this type of case has been succinctly stated 
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in the California case of Shaw v. Union Escrow and Realty 
Co., 53 Cal. App. 66, 200 P. 25, 26 (1921) when it was 
announced: 
It is not necessary in order to estab-
lish bad faith . . . that the vendor be 
shown to have refused to go on with the 
transaction because of some gain which 
would have accrued to him. It is suffi-
cient if he refuses to convey, where, 
through his own negligence, he has put 
it out of his power to fulfill the obli-
gations of his contract. (emphasis added) 
The California court then went on to characterize the 
bad faith requirement as an anomaly stating that the 
accepted rule was that a person is entitled to have in 
damages the worth of that which would have been rendered 
him under the full performance of the contract, Shaw v. 
Union Escrow and Realty Co., supra. 
In the instant case, respondents Connell, Boyce, 
and Ehlers were negligent in allowing the plaintiff's 
Smith to adversely possess the land in question. The 
fact that the property was adversely possessed is in and 
of itself evidence of that negligence. The requirements 
of adverse possession are extremely difficult to meet. 
Yet the lower court found with regard to those require-
ments that the taxes for the years 1952-1954, and 1959-
1966 had been paid by the plaintiffs below and that those 
plaintiffs had "exclusive, complete, actual, open, 
notorious, hostile and continuous undisputed possession" 
of the property in question. (Findings of Fact and Con-
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elusions of Law.) This could not have occurred in the 
absence of negligence. 
The conduct of respondents as borne out by their 
testimony further shows their negligent management and 
control of the property in question. All three had ample 
opportunity to verify payment of the taxes on said prop-
erty , (Tr. p. 39) to inspect the property to determine 
who was farming it, (Tr. pp. 45, 46) and to generally 
review the conditions of the property. Ehlers has held 
title since 1949, and Boyce and Connell obtained control 
of the late Mr. Pender's interest in the property in 196 3 
(Tr. p. 37). It is undisputed that the property has been 
farmed consistently either by plaintiffs or under plaintiffs1 
control and direction during the entire time defendant 
Connell, Boyce and Ehlers have held title to the same. 
(Judgment and Decree.) Nevertheless, there was never 
once a demand made on the Smiths or those farming under 
them for any kind of a lease payment or to cease and desist 
their farming practices. (Tr. p. 45) On the other hand, 
Warr purchased through a realtor and saw and purchased 
the land in the fall at a time when it was difficult to 
determine if the land was being farmed and if so by whom. 
(Tr. pp. 46, 53-54) Therefore, at the time of entering 
into the contract the sellers had been in a position 
for many years to make certain they had good title to 
the land in question whereas the buyer was depending 
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entirely upon the sellers to give him good title. That 
the sellers cannot now give good title is a clear case 
of negligence, or in other words, bad faith on their 
part. Hence even using the bad faith requirement, the 
benefit of the bargain damage rule applies in this case. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION 
OF THE AWARD UNDER THE OUT-OF-POCKET LOSS RULE. 
It is appellant's position that this Court 
is to be guided by the benefit of the bargain rule. 
Nevertheless, if this Court were to adopt the out-of-pocket 
loss rule as the lower court did, it should nevertheless 
correct the errors made by the lower court in applying 
that rule. 
The court below gave judgment to the appellant 
from respondent Ehlers for $4,442.65 but only $3,807.15 
from respondents Connell and Boyce. (Judgment and Decree 
on Cross-Complaint.) The clear testimony is that respondents 
Connell and Boyce have been paid by appellant the sum 
of $5,067.65. (Tr. p. 48.) Moreover, counsel for Boyce 
and Connell in paragraph (8) of the response memo to 
appellant's Objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Judgment Proposed stated that the basis for 
the figure used in that judgment "was founded on infor-
mation furnished cross-defendants by office or accountant 
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for cross-plaintiffs, and in view of facts now available, 
correctable," (Emphasis added,) Therefore, the damages 
should be increased by $1,260.50 if the out-of-pocket 
loss rule is applied. 
The judgment entered below provided no interest 
from the dates of the payments by the appellant to the 
respondents up to the date of judgment. A fair amount 
to be awarded appellant as interest on the amounts paid 
would be 8 percent per annum. Counsel for respondent 
Ehlers and counsel for respondents Connell and Boyce, 
in their responses to appellant's Objections to Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment Proposed, both 
admit that appellant is entitled to 6 percent from the 
time of the payments until judgment. It is submitted 
that under the out-of-pocket loss rule appellant is 
entitled to at least 6 percent interest from the date 
of his payments up to the time of judgment. In view 
of current interest rates, however, a more appropriate 
amount would be 8 percent. 
With regard to other appellant's objections 
to the court's rulings below, appellant directs the 
Court to its Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment and Decree on Cross-complaint of 
R. L. Warr which was filed below and which has been made 
a part of the record on appeal. 
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POINT THREE 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Under either theory of recovery, whether bene-
fit of the bargain or out-of-pocket loss, appellant is 
entitled to his attorney's fees. The court below found 
that the respondents were in breach of their Uniform 
Real Estate Contracts under date of August 20, 1973, 
"for their inability and failure to deliver possession 
of the premises and their obvious inability to convey 
title to the premises free and clear of all encumbrances." 
The court below, however, denied the payment of attorney's 
fees without any further explanation. 
The contracts in question under paragraph 21 
specifically provide for an attorney's fee if there 
should be a default "in any of the covenants or agreements 
contained herein." That contract clause provides that 
those fees "which may arise or accrue from enforcing 
this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises 
covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder 
or by the statutes of the state of Utah whether such 
remedy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise" must 
be paid by the defaulting party. (Emphasis added.) It 
is clear and obvious that appellant, both in defending 
the initial claim of adverse possession and further in 
seeking recovery on his cross-complaint against respondents, 
has incurred substantial attorney's fees which contrac-
tually must be paid for by the respondents. 
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POINT FOUR 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO HIS COSTS OF COURT. 
The court below in its judgment ordered that 
each side was to bear its own costs* The general rule 
is, however, that the prevailing party, as a matter of 
course, should normally be awarded its costs. Rule 54(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant was the 
prevailing party below and there is no indication by the 
court why it should not be awarded its costs. Further, 
again referring to paragraph 21 of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contracts in question, the respondents by contract agreed 
to pay "all costs and expenses." This would include normal 
court costs. Therefore, appellant is entitled to his 
court costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant contracted to buy a piece of property 
from respondents which, except for the mismanagement and 
lack of control over that property by respondents, would 
have resulted in his having today a piece of property 
worth much more than what he paid for it. Appellant 
should not have to bear that loss. The loss is not specu-
lative, but rather, has been clearly testified to. In 
fact, the property in question has since been sold by the 
plaintiffs. This Court should therefore remand the case 
to the lower court with an instruction that the lower 
court is to award appellant damages based on the benefit 
of the bargain rule and that the value of the property 
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is to be measured as of the time of the breach. 
It would be manifest injustice to simply allow 
only the out-of-pocket losses of appellant. Even so, 
if that is to be the rule, the lower court has not suffi-
ciently provided for that loss and that amount should be 
increased from $8,249.80 to $9,510.30. Further, there 
would not be true restoration of out-of-pocket losses if 
appellant were not entitled to interest from the time 
of the payments until judgment at the rate of 8 percent 
or, as a very minimum, at the rate of 6 percent. 
Finally, appellant has been required to defend 
the action against the lower court plaintiffs. It further 
became necessary to bring this action against the respon-
dents . The contract which was signed clearly provides 
for attorney's fees in such a case, whether this Court 
adopts the benefit of the bargain rule or the out-of-
pocket loss rule. Therefore this case should also be 
remanded to the lower court with an instruction that appel-
lant is to be awarded his attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
DAVID A. WESTERBY 
Kirton, McConkie, Boyer & Boyle 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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